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No MORE PLAIN MEANING: Farrar v. Hobby
Anyone who reads even a few fee award cases will quickly form
the impression that judges shoot from the hip. They indulge in
casual speculations about the reasonableness of hours and the
value of lawyers' time. They mete out fees as rewards and punish-
ments. They offer paper-thin rationales for decisions on which,




You became an attorney to right society's wrongs. One day a potential
client arrives in your office claiming that his business was abruptly closed
down by state employees. You diligently investigate and determine that
valid civil rights claims exist. You take the case. After filing suit, you spend
ten years successfully staving off the defense. In the interim, Congress
passes a law that will entitle you to an award of attorney's fees should you
prevail. Eventually there is a jury trial. Things go poorly. You prevail on
only one claim. No damages are awarded. You appeal. More time passes.
The client is awarded $1 in nominal damages as a result of the appeal.
You file for attorney's fees on your client's behalf as you are entitled to do.
The United States District Court awards over $300,000 in fees, costs, and
interest. You know that $300,000 is an unreasonable fee and fully expect
the figure to be reduced in accordance with precedent should the defend-
ant appeal. The defendant appeals. The court of appeals takes back all of
the fee award. The court says that despite the enforceable judgment for
$1, your client failed to prevail. You appeal. Nineteen years after you filed
the original law suit, the United States Supreme Court agrees that your
client prevailed. You keep reading the opinion. The Court goes on to say
that because the judgment was de minimis, any fee is unreasonable. You
give up civil rights work. Welcome to a sanitized version of Farrar v.
Hobby.
2
The statutory award of attorney's fees is often a catalyst for civil rights
litigation. "If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own
attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the
public interest .... ,"3 The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976,
4
1. Charles Silver, Unloading the Lodestar: Toward a New Fee Award Procedure, 70 TEX. L.
REV., 865, 950 (1992).
2. 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
3. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam).
4. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. III 1989-92)). The statute states:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a,
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681
et. seq.], or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et. seq.], the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States,
a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
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commonly referred to as "Section 1988," was enacted to encourage private
enforcement of civil rights. 5 Section 1988 permits the trial court, in its
discretion, to award reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing parties.
6
Although the enactment of § 1988 resulted in increased numbers of civil
rights case filings,7 one extremely unwelcome result has been protracted
litigation over fees.8 Recently, in Farrar v. Hobby,9 the Supreme Court is-
sued a Solomon-like ruling, holding that a party awarded only nominal
damages is a prevailing party under § 1988,10 but finding it usually unrea-
sonable to award any attorney's fees where only nominal damages are
awarded. 1'
This Comment examines the discrepancy between the intent of Con-
gress in enacting § 1988 and the Farrar ruling. Part II provides the back-
ground of Farrar, including a brief history of civil rights law, a description
of the remedies and damages available to civil rights claimants and the
legislative and judicial history of § 1988. Part III summarizes the facts and
holding of Farrar. Part IV reviews relevant cases decided since Farrar and
illustrates the decision's potential impact on lower court rulings. Part V
analyzes the decision and criticizes several aspects of the holding. First,
the Court attaches undue significance to the disparity between the amount
Id. Recently amended, § 1988 now provides for the reimbursement of expert witness fees as
part of the award of attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (Supp. III 1989-92).
Added as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 1981a is used where there has been
intentional employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (Supp. III 1989-92). Section
1982 provides that all United States citizens are entitled to the same real and personal prop-
erty rights as white citizens. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988). Section 1983 permits civil suits against
those who act under color of state law to deprive citizens, or those within the jurisdiction of
the United States, of their civil rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1985 creates civil
remedies for a variety of conspiracies to deprive persons of constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 (1988). Section 1986 is used when someone has knowledge of the conspiracies de-
scribed in § 1985 and neglects to take preventive action. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1988). Tide IX is
available to those who are discriminated against on the basis of gender in an educational
setting. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988). Title VI protects against discriminatory acts committed by
those receiving federal funding. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
5. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,
5910. "[Clivil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have
proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindi-
cate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain." Id. See generally SuBoOM-
MITTEE ON CONSTrTUTIONAL RIGHTSr, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss.,
CIVIL RiHTs ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS Acr OF 1976-SouRcE Booxc LEGIsLATnvE HISTORY,
TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS (1976) (compilation of legislative history and supplemental
documents); Robert A. Malson, Note, In Response to Alyesa-The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 21 ST. Louis U. LJ. 430 (1977) (summarizing the legislative history of
§ 1988).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. III 1989-92).
7. Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court, Con-
gress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEx. L. Rav. 291, 362 n.416 (1990) ("Within five years of [§ 1988's]
enactment, there was a 66 percent increase in the number of civil rights suits filed annually in
the federal courts... balloon[ing] from 17,543 in 1976 to 29,173 in 1981 . .. .") (quoting
Robert A. Diamond, The Firestorm Over Attorney Fee Awards, 69 A.B.A. J. 1420, 1420 (1983)).
8. See 2 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRELIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS,
DEFENSES, AND FEES § 17.5 (2d ed. 1991) (noting that the Supreme Court alone has decided
more than thirty § 1988 cases since its passage).
9. 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
10. Id. at 573.
11. Id. at 575.
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sought by the plaintiffs and the nominal damages awarded without prop-
erly considering the public interest as required by legislative history and
precedent. Second, in arriving at the definition of prevailing party, the
Court set the stage for a battle over the "catalyst" doctrine 12 under which
attorney's fees are sometimes awarded. Each of these errors may chill fu-
ture civil rights litigation. The combination could be lethal. Congress
must reaffirm its commitment to civil rights by streamlining the process of
awarding attorney's fees.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The History of Civil Rights and Constitutional Tort Litigation'
3
Until the Civil War, the states and the national government struggled
for political, legislative and judicial power, with the states generally prevail-
ing. 14 After the war, the national government emerged the obvious victor.
Racial atrocities in southern states continued, however, unchecked by
either state law enforcement or state courts. 15 In an argument for the
continuing use of § 1983,16justice Blackmun suggested three reasons un-
derlying the history of unsuccessful federal government intervention in
state activities.17 First, the Constitution included few prohibitions against
the state activities.1 8 Second, no affirmative federal remedy for the vindi-
cation1 9 of constitutional rights existed.20 Third, federal courts lacked
general jurisdiction over federal claims.2 1 This lack of federal jurisdiction
12. In order for attorney's fees to be awarded under the catalyst theory, the lawsuit must
be a significant factor behind changing the defendant's conduct, short of an enforceable
judgment. In some jurisdictions, the change must be one required by law. See, e.g., Heath v.
Brown, 807 F.2d 1229, 1233-34 (5th Cir. 1987) (determining that plaintiffs could be prevail-
ing parties if the district court found they were a "substantial factor or significant catalyst"
behind the city's ending its unconstitutional enforcement of the state identification law).
13. Civil rights litigation is generally defined to include litigation under a variety of
federal statutes, including nineteenth and twentieth century antidiscrimination provisions.
Theodore Eisenberg & StewartJ. Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, reprinted
in 3 CnIL RicHs LTmGATION AND ATroR.EY FEEs ANNUAL HANDBOOK 3, 4 (Jules Lobel &
Barbara M. Wolvovitz eds., 1987). Constitutional tort litigation is a subset of civil rights
litigation and refers to § 1983 actions and similar suits brought against federal actors
pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). Id. Substantive constitutional violations arise directly under the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
14. Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 H~av. L. RE,. 1133, 1135-41
(1977) (summarizing the significant aspects of U.S. history prior to the Civil War).
15. Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60
Nw. U. L. Rv. 277, 277-81 (1965).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
17. Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the
Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1985).
18. Id. at 3. The then-existing constitutional prohibitions banned states from passing
legislation that created ex post facto laws and bills of attainder or that impaired contractual
obligations. Id.
19. "Vindicate" is defined as "to clear of suspicion, blame, or doubt." BLACK'S LAW Dic
TioNARY 1570 (6th ed. 1990).
20. Blackmun, supra note 17, at 3-4.
21. Id. at 4.
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forced non-diverse litigants into state courts-the very courts that origi-
nally refused to provide protection.
22
To remedy the situation, the Reconstruction Congress enacted the
Thirteenth,23 Fourteenth,2 4 and Fifteenth 25 Amendments to the United
States Constitution. In order to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments,
Congress also passed a number of Civil Rights Acts aimed at protecting
citizens from discriminatory acts of state actors and private citizens. 26 Sec-
tion 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was the forerunner of § 1983, under
which the majority of modem civil rights actions are now brought.27 In
discussing the legislative history of the Civil Rights Acts, Justice Blackmun
noted that "[t] he significance of the reach of the Civil Rights Acts and their
encroachment on state prerogatives was lost on no one."28 Referring to
the encroachment of federalism, one opponent, Senator Saulsbury, de-
scribed the 1866 Civil Rights Act as "one of the most dangerous that was
ever introduced into the Senate of the United States .. ."29 Although
congressional opposition to the Reconstruction movement was heated,
federalism prevailed.
22. Id.
23. The Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, enacted in 1865, states:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
24. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, enacted in 1868, states:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;, nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
25. The Fifteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution, enacted in 1870, states:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of color, or previous
condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONsr. amend. XV.
26. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (outlawing Southern Black Codes); Act of May
31, 1870, ch. 14, 16 Stat. 140 (protecting voting rights); Ku Klux Klan Act of Apr. 20, 1871,
ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (this legislation provided a civil remedy for constitutional violations and
also imposed criminal and civil penalties for conspiracies to deprive others of constitutional
rights); Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (prohibiting racial discrimination in pub-
lic accommodations); Act of Mar. 3, 1875, §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. 470 (part 3) (creating general
federal question jurisdiction in civil actions). See generally, Developments in the Law, supra, note
14, at 1135-41 (discussing the history of the Civil Rights Acts).
27. See, e.g., I ScHwAwrz & KiRICN, supra note 8, § 1.1 n.1 (explaining that § 1983 is now
more important than any other federal statute to enforce civil rights).
28. Blackmun, supra note 17, at 6.
29. Id. at 6 (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1866)).
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Despite the impressive flurry of legislative activity, the courts quickly
reined in the scope of Congress' authority by declaring sections of the new
Acts unconstitutional and by narrowly construing the remaining provi-
sions.3 0 Consequently, few civil rights litigants made use of the Civil
Rights Acts. 3 ' Except for a small number of cases involving the voting
franchise,3 2 the remaining Civil Rights Acts33 fell into a long period of
general disuse.3 4 The few claims brought under § 1983 were based on a
belief that the "under color of" requirement was limited to extant legisla-
tion.3 5 Because of real and perceived limitations, § 1983 was virtually in-
visible until the late 1930s, awaiting a more liberal societal and judicial
climate.
Whatever the reason, in the late 1930s novel § 1983 claims began ap-
pearing. In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,3 6 the Court
struck down, on constitutional grounds, an ordinance that permitted local
officials to harass labor organizers.3 7 In 1939 the United States Depart-
ment of Justice created a "Civil Rights Unit."3 8 Because few modem civil
rights statutes were available, the Civil Rights Unit began vigorously resur-
recting the remaining sections of the Civil Rights Acts.
3 9
A few years later, the Court interpreted "under color of" state law to
include criminal conduct not expressly authorized by state statute. 40 This
was a substantial change because all prior § 1983 claims were based on
extant state legislation. In United States v. Classic, state officials clearly vio-
lated state law by fraudulently counting votes. 4 1 The Court held that such
illegal conduct was possible only because "the wrongdoer is clothed with
the authority of state action."42 Therefore, the "under color of law" ele-
30. Id. at 8-10. See also ROBERT K. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CMIL RIGHrs: QUEsT
FOR A SwoRD 40-47 (1947) (describing the early curtailment of the Civil Rights Acts).
31. Michael G. Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of
Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1494-95 (1989).
32. See Shapo, supra note 15, at 282-84.
33. CARR, supra note 30, at 40-47, 49.
34. A number of intriguing theories have been offered to explain the failure to proceed
under § 1983. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 30, at 1493-1507 (theorizing that § 1983 was "al-
most dead on arrival" because of the narrow construction of "under color of" state law, the
failure of the Court to find many civil rights and the overt identification of § 1983 with racial
issues); Louise Weinberg, The Monroe Mystery Solved: Beyond the "Unhappy Histoy" Theory of
Civil Rights Litigation, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 737 (1991) (arguing that selective incorporation of
the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was the basis
for § 1983's revitalization); Comment, Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil
Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361 (1951) (arguing that Congress' failure to enact new civil rights
legislation necessitated resurrecting the Civil Rights Acts).
35. Shapo. supra note 15, at 283-84.
36. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
37. Id. at 516. Although the Court struck the ordinance as facially unconstitutional,
there was disagreement whether the constitutional basis was the First Amendment, id., or
whether labor organizing was a privilege or immunity of national citizenship. Id. at 512, 519-
27.
38. CARR, supra note 30, at 1.
39. Id. at 47-55.
40. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
41. Id. at 307.
42. Id. at 326.
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ment of § 20, 43 the criminal counterpart of what is now § 1983, was
fulfilled.
The fatal beating of a black prisoner by town sheriffs led to the next
seminal § 1983 case. 44 The Screws v. United States plurality reaffirmed the
holding in Classic that illegal conduct may be conduct "under color of'
state law.
45
Despite these earlier holdings, only after Monroe v. Pape4 6 was § 1983
viewed as a viable tool with which to redress civil rights. In Monroe, the
government argued that a complete remedy for injured persons already
existed at state law. Justice Douglas pointed out that, inter alia, the federal
remedy was enacted precisely because states failed to enforce their own
laws. "The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the
latter need not be first brought and refused before the federal one is in-
voked."4 7 Monroe also reaffirmed that state actors who commit ultra vires
acts do so "under color of' state law.
4 8
The common perception is that Monroe led to a torrent of civil rights
litigation. 49 Others, however, argue that "the image of overwhelming
numbers of civil rights cases is overstated and borders on a myth." 50 Sec-
tion 1983 is at the middle of the firestorm over civil rights. Some com-
43. 18 U.S.C. § 52 (1934).
44. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 92-93 (1945).
Hall, a young negro about thirty years of age, was handcuffed and taken by car to
the courthouse. As Hall alighted from the car at the courthouse square, the three
petitioners began beating him with their fists and with a solid-bar blackjack about
eight inches long and weighing two pounds. They claimed Hall had reached for a
gun and had used insulting language as he alighted from the car. But after Hall,
still handcuffed, had been knocked to the ground they continued to beat him from
fifteen to thirty minutes until he was unconscious. Hall was then dragged feet first
through the court-house yard into the jail and thrown upon the floor dying. An
ambulance was called and Hall was removed to a hospital where he died within the
hour without regaining consciousness.
Id at 92-93. The Court's description of the beating is eerily similar to the recent murder of
Malice Green in Detroit by two police officers. See Jury Reaches Verdict Against Ex-Officer in
Detroit Beating, WASH. PosT, Aug. 22, 1993, at A9.
45. Screws, 325 U.S. at 107.
46. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (Harlan & Stewart, J.J., concurring) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing). The facts in Monroe were scandalous. Thirteen Chicago police officers, without a
search warrant or an arrest warrant, broke into a home. The officers ransacked the home
under the guise of a search while forcing all of the family members to stand nude in the
living room. Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police station where he was held and interro-
gated without being permitted to call his family or an attorney. No criminal charges were
ever filed against Mr. Monroe. Id. at 169.
47. Id. at 183. Monroe also held that "person" as used in § 1983 did not extend to in-
clude municipalities; therefore, the City of Chicago could not be sued thereunder, ld at 187-
92. A later Supreme Court case, Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., overruled this aspect of Monroe,
permitting suits against municipalities. Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978).
48. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184-85.
49. Eric H. Zagrans, "Under Color or' What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liabil-
ity, 71 VA. L. REv. 499, 502 & n.14 (1989) (describing the growth of§ 1983 filings after Monroe
as "exponential").
50. Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 13, at 3. Eisenberg and Schwab largely based their
findings on a study done in three judicial districts over a short time span. In addition, their
study also made some significant internal statistical adjustments. I& at 9-20. But see Zagrans,
supra note 49, at 502 & n.14, explaining that other studies simply rely on the raw data pro-
vided by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Id. This difference in starting
points may well account for the significant discrepancy in findings.
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mentators want to see its scope narrowed.5 1 Some view § 1983 as
federalism run rampant.52 Others see § 1983 as an important tool for pro-
tecting civil rights.53 Whatever one's viewpoint, annual filings of civil
rights cases number in the thousands. The basis for the claims ranges
from the serious 54 to the seemingly absurd. 55 It is this latter category that
triggers vitriolic attacks against civil rights claimants and the civil rights
bar.56
B. Potential Remedies for Civil Rights Claimants
There are three primary remedies for civil rights claimants: criminal,
civil and administrative. 57 Depending upon the nature of the violation,
criminal charges may be filed against any actor who willfully committed
the violation.5 8 If the prosecution is successful, imprisonment and fines
may be imposed. Alternatively, a claimant may bring a civil suit with the
potential for obtaining compensatory and perhaps punitive damages. Fi-
nally, depending on the facts, an administrative procedure may punish the
state actor.59 These remedies may be combined. The injured person has
no control over criminal prosecutions or administrative decisions.
Serious questions remain as to the efficacy of the potential remedies.
While administrative remedies may punish the wrongdoer, as with crimi-
nal prosecutions, they do little to redress the harm caused to the plaintiff.
Furthermore, the Rodney King trials have raised questions as to whether
criminal prosecutions really are an effective remedy, particularly when po-
51. Shapo, supra note 15, at 297-300. Professor Shapo suggests that the scope of § 1983
requires a showing of outrageous conduct or that a state's laws be "virtually non-existent"
through lack of enforcement before a claim may be brought. Id. However, these arguments
are unsupported by the statutory language.
In addition, while § 1983 cuts a wide swath, it does not create any substantive rights.
Instead, § 1983 provides a remedy for protecting rights that arise under the Constitution, the
Bill of Rights, and legislation.
52. E.g., Zagrans, supra note 49, at 589-98.
53. For an example of material calling for an expansive view of civil rights, see 8 CPvIL
RiGHrs LmGATION AND A-rroRNEY FEES ANNuAL HANDBOOK (Steven Saltzman & Barbara M.
Wolvovitz eds., 1992).
54. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
55. Shields v. Shetler, 682 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Colo. 1988), concluding plaintiffs § 1981
claim was frivolous because there was no showing of discrimination on the basis of race
where plaintiff was a white male. Id. at 1175.
56. E.g., Nancy Rutter, Blood Money, 12 CAL. LAw. 34 (1992). Ms. Rutter is particularly
upset about those claimants who sue for injuries caused by police dog attacks:
A small new specialty within the brutality bar is suing the police and, especially, the
sheriffs department after alleged attacks by police dogs. To date, such cases have
not proven the most lucrative in the field: Mann & Cook has lost four and settled
one of the five dog-bite cases they've taken to trial. But these self-proclaimed "Kings
of Bark" will prevail, predicts one defense lawyer: "They're still plowing the field.
Sooner or later they'll get a hit."
Id. at 37.
Ms. Rutter's primary complaint is that many civil rights claims are brought solely for the
potential awards of attorney's fees. l
57. Judge Jon 0. Newman, Providing an Effective Federal Civil Remedy for Civil Rights Viola-
tion, reprinted in 8 CVL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND Arro,,av FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 3, 4
(Steven Saltzman & Barbara M. Wolvovitz eds., 1992).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1969 & Cumm. Supp. 1993).
59. Newman, supra note 57, at 4.
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lice officers are involved. 6° One judge recounted the extraordinary diffi-
culties faced in a criminal prosecution of police officers:
[MIany years ago ... I initiated the first federal prosecution in
Connecticut for police brutality. The facts were indisputable. A
police officer had arrested a teenager for disorderly conduct and
placed him in a police cruiser.... The officer got out, pulled the
handcuffed teenager from the back seat and punched him flush
in the face.... The details of the episode were testified to by the
teenager and, more significantly, by the officer's police part-
ner.... The trial jury took barely a half-hour to return a verdict
of not guilty.61
As the judge's recital suggests, civil rights litigation is less successful
than other types of litigation. 62 For instance, in constitutional tort claims,
non-prisoner claims have approximately a fifty-percent success rate, 63
while a prisoner claim succeeds only eighteen percent of the time.6
Unfortunately, while difficult to mount, the traditional civil suit re-
mains the best existing personalized remedy for a civil rights claimant.
However, as in Farrar, only nominal damages may be awarded.
C. Available Remedies and Damages
The issue of a reasonable fee in Farrar turned in large part on the
distinction between the amount of damages sought in relation to the nom-
inal damages actually awarded. 65 It is, therefore, important to understand
the manner in which damages and other relief may be awarded in civil
rights litigation.
A declaratory judgment is an equitable remedy. The judgment de-
fines the rights of the parties without requiring specific action. 66 Declara-
tory relief may also serve a public purpose by clarifying important legal
issues.
67
Depending upon the fact pattern, individual 68 or institutional injunc-
tions69 are also available to civil rights claimants. Individual or private in-
junctions are quite specific in nature. For instance, in Lance v. Plummer,
70
60. Id. Cf Jury Reaches Verdict Against Ex-Officer in Detroit Beating, supra note 44, account of
the recent fatal police beating in Detroit where two white former police officers were con-
victed of the second-degree murder of a black man. Id.
61. Newman, supra note 57, at 6.
62. Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation:
The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719,
726-30 (1988).
63. Id. at 730. The study was conducted from 1975-1984 in three districts. The figures
include an estimate of the number of claims settled without judicial intervention. Id. at 721-
23, 726-28.
64. Id. at 730 (the authors suspect the study may overstate prisoners' success rates).
65. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566, 574-75 (1992).
66. 2 CIVIL ACanONs ACAINS'r STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT § 14.5 (Jon L. Craig et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1992).
67. Id.
68. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES § 7.4(4) (2d ed. 1993).
69. Id.
70. 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 929 (1966).
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one particular sheriff was forbidden from harassing black persons using
public accommodations. 71 In Caruso v. Ward,72 a police department was
prohibited from conducting random drug tests of specific officers in the
absence of reasonable suspicion.
73
Institutional injunctions are broadly directed towards a systematized
series of wrongs, such as in a school system where de facto or de jure
discrimination must be corrected.74 Or, prison officials may be ordered to
limit the amount of time a prisoner spends in solitary confinement with-
out review.
75
As in Farrar, monetary damages may be at issue. Generally, the types
of monetary damages available in tort claims are also available in civil
rights cases: nominal damages,76 compensatory or general damages,
7 7
special or consequential damages, 78 and punitive or exemplary
damages.
79
The Court has addressed the damages issue as to both constitutional
torts and deprivations of substantive constitutional rights. In Carey v.
Piphus,80 two high school students were summarily suspended from high
school, one for smoking marijuana and the other for wearing an earring
that may have signified gang affiliation.81 The students sued under
§ 1983. The district court held that the students' procedural due process
rights were violated by the way in which the suspensions were made but
refused to award damages in the absence of evidence of a compensable
injury.82 The Court considered whether a showing of actual injury was
required to enable a "substantial 'non-punitive' damages" award.8 3 The
students argued that substantial damages should be awarded whenever a
deprivation of a constitutional right occurred, because of the inherent
value of such rights as well as a societal need to deter the behavior in
question. Alternatively, they contended that a violation of constitutional
71. Id. at 591.
72. 530 N.E.2d 850, 850 (N.Y. 1988).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393 (D. Colo. 1977).
75. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1101 (9th Cir. 1986).
76. Nominal damages are awarded where a plaintiff is able to establish a cause of action
but unable to prove either compensatory or consequential damages. Nominal damages have
been awarded in amounts from six cents to the princely sum of $1. 1 DoBBs, supra note 68,
§ 3.3(2).
77. Within the field of personal injury law, compensatory damages are paid for non-
pecuniary losses such as pain and suffering. Id. § 3.2. Obviously, such losses may be difficult
to prove and quantify. Id. § 3.3(6).
78. Consequential damages flow from the injury, such as medical bills, but are distinct
from the harm to the plaintiff. Id. § 3.3(4).
79. The general standard for awards of punitive damages in civil rights cases is that the
defendant's behavior must demonstrate a reckless or callous disregard of, or indifference to,
the rights of others. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 33 (1983). See also 2 DOBBS, supra note 68,
§ 7.4(3) at 347-48.
80. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
81. Id. at 248-50.
82. Id. at 251-52.
83. Id. at 252.
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magnitude creates a presumption of harm, even in the absence of proof of
actual injury.
8 4
A unanimous Court was unpersuaded. Instead, the Court reasoned
that § 1983 created a "species of tort liability"85 and tort law principles
should be applied in the constitutional tort context wherever possible. 86
The Court then followed this line of reasoning to what it believed to be
the natural conclusion, holding that compensatory damages could only be
awarded where the plaintiffs showed an actual injury.87 The Court went
on to distinguish some types of claims in which it would presume harm,
such as defamation per se or a deprivation of the right to vote. The Court
concluded that, unlike the case at bar, it would be extremely difficult to
make a showing of injury in defamation cases, while there could be no
question that those particular deprivations automatically create harm. 88
However, because the Court agreed that the right to procedural due pro-
cess was an "absolute" constitutional right, the vindication of that right
required an award of nominal damages without proof of injury.89
After Carey, questions remained about the availability of damages for
the deprivation of a substantive constitutional right, such as freedom of
speech. In Memphis Community School District v. Stachura,90 a case involving
a junior high school teacher's First Amendment right to academic free-
dom,9 1 the Court followed its earlier line of reasoning in Carey. The jury
instruction at issue read:
If you find that the Plaintiff has been deprived of a Constitu-
tional right, you may award damages to compensate him for the
deprivation.... In one sense, no monetary value we place upon
Constitutional rights can measure their importance in our society
or compensate a citizen adequately for their deprivation. How-
ever, just because these rights are not capable of precise evalua-
tion does not mean that an appropriate monetary amount should
not be awarded....
You may wish to consider the importance of the right in our
system of government, the role which this right has played in the
84. Id. at 254.
85. Id. at 253.
86. Id. at 254-59.
87. Id. In dicta, the Court supposed that exemplary or punitive damages might be
awarded to provide the appropriate deterrent effect. Id. at 257 n.1l.
88. Id. at 262-64. But see, Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration
after Carey v. Piphus, 93 HRv. L. REv. 966 (1980) (arguing that the common law tort theory
utilized in Carey fails to provide either adequate compensation or to create a sufficient deter-
rent against constitutional deprivations).
89. Carey, 435 U.S. at 266. One author believes that the Caey decision was based on the
Court's concern that juries, in the absence of any guidelines, could make awards for "techni-
cal" due process violations. He hypothesizes that the Court wanted to prevent such an injudi-
cious use of the justice system and to protect defendants from a myriad of minor claims.
1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CML LIBERTIEs LITIGATION § 4.02 (Wendy Bliss et
al. eds., 3d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1993).
90. 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
91. Id. at 300-02. The teacher showed pictures of his pregnant wife and films about
human growth and sexuality to his seventh grade class while teaching a course on human
reproduction. All films were preapproved by the school principal. Id. at 300-01.
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history of our republic, [and] the significance of the activities
which the Plaintiff was engaged in at the time of the violation of
the right.
9 2
The jury awarded over $300,000 in compensatory and punitive damages,
which the trial court slightly reduced.
93
The Court decided whether an award of compensatory damages,
based solely on the value of a substantive constitutional right, was valid.
9 4
The teacher argued that Carey should be distinguished because it involved
a procedural due process violation, not a substantive constitutional
right.95 The Court remained unpersuaded, stating that Carey "does not
establish a two-tiered system of constitutional rights, with substantive rights
afforded greater protection than 'mere' procedural safeguards." 96 De-
spite some language that may leave open the door to presumed damages
as substitute damages in some unspecified situation,97 the Carey limitations
appear to be wide-ranging.
D. Theories of Fee Shifting
The concept of fee-shifting is deceptively simple-the party causing
the harm should pay the costs of remedying the harm. However, the sheer
volume of litigation suggests the reality of fee-shifting is not necessarily
socially desirable or simple to implement. Consequently, attorneys and
economists have begun exploring the intricacies of fee-shifting to better
understand the appropriateness of fee-shifting in a particular context.
9 8
92. Id. at 302-03 (alterations in original).
93. Id. at 303.
94. Id. at 300.
95. Id. at 309.
96. Id.
97. "Presumed damages are a substitute for ordinary compensatory damages, not a supple-
ment for an award that fully compensates the alleged injury. When a plaintiff seeks compen-
sation for an injury that is likely to have occurred but difficult to establish, some form of
presumed damages may possibly be appropriate." Id at 310-11 (emphasis in original). The
concurrence, written by Justice Marshall,joined byJustices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens,
suggested that a deprivation of the right to participate in a political demonstration might be
an appropriate situation in which to award compensatory damages. Id at 315. See also 1
NAHMOD, supra note 89, § 4.02. Professor Nahmod argues for presumed damages where
there are First Amendment violations and consequently for a narrow reading of Stachura.
However, he admits that the "majority's broad language [in the case] may reflect [the Court's]
willingness to preclude presumed damages in all § 1983 cases." Id. at 273.
98. See, e.g., Ronald Braeutigain et al., An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Sys-
tems, 47 Lw & CoNTEMp. PRons. 173 (1984) (providing logical models of a variety of fee-
shifting systems); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theoryfor Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L.
REv. 669 (1986) (calling for "self-policing" reforms in fee shifting that restrict collusion);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lauyer as Bounty
Hunter is not Working, 42 MD. L REv. 215 (1983) (arguing that the private attorney general
functions as an entrepreneur and should be regulated accordingly); PhilipJ. Mause, Winner
Takes Al" A Re-examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IowA L. Rn'. 26 (1969) (arguing that
limited indemnity legislation should be enacted to provide an empirical basis for a sophisti-
cated study of fee shifting); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Fee Shifting- A Critical
Overview, 1982 Dvu, LJ. 651 (1982) (discussing the underlying rationales for one-way and
two-way fee shifting).
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Although fee-shifting is generally a legislative creation, such enact-
ments do not occur in a vacuum. Social policies and goals drive the crea-
tion of fee-shifting.9 9 Professor Thomas Rowe has identified six such
policies: 10 0 (1) fundamental fairness, (2) making a litigant whole, (3)
punishment, (4) the private attorney general doctrine, (5) a desire to shift
the strengths of the parties and (6) creation of economic incentives for
speedy settlement. 10 1 To meet these goals, fee-shifting seeks to affect the
initial decision to bring suit and the outcome of that decision, such as
whether parties are amenable to settlement, the speed at which the case is
resolved, and an acceptable settlement figure, if any.
10 2
Different goals require a different method of shifting fees. For in-
stance, one-way fee shifting, generally providing fee awards to prevailing
plaintiffs, is viewed as an encouragement to bring lawsuits, such as with
§ 1988 and its underlying private attorney general policy.. 0 3 Two-way fee-
shifting, from the winner to the loser, indemnifies the winner.
1 0 4
Factors beyond the control of legislators further complicate the po-
tential effects of any fee-shifting statute. These "ingredients" include the
personal characteristics of the parties, the amount of the potential fee in
relation to the amount at stake, and how the parties evaluate the strengths
of their case. 10 5 One of the most critical factors is whether the parties are
risk-averse or risk neutral.
10 6
The lack of specificity in most fee-shifting statutes creates additional
problems.'0 7 As a result, courts have been forced to interpret fee-shifting
statutes in a piecemeal fashion leading to seemingly inconsistent hold-
ings.' 0 8 Opponents of fee-shifting argue that it creates an incredible bur-
den on the judicial system in many ways. First, the sheer volume of civil
rights cases is seen as withdrawing limited judicial resources from other
claims.' 0 9 In addition, some see fee-shifting as draining public treasur-
99. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 98, at 652-80.
100. See id. at 653.
101. Id
102. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PROBS. 139, 143 (1984).
103. See id. at 140-41 & n.8.
104. Rowe, supra note 98, at 653-54. Professor Rowe notes that there is little literature
examining the rationale behind two-way fee shifting, despite its near universal existence
outside of the United States. Id. at 653-57. See also Mause, supra note 98, at 28-33 (describing
the various rationales that may underlie the indemnity system, including full fee shifting to
prevailing parties).
105. Rowe, supra note 102, at 142-43.
106. See id. at 153. Those who are risk-averse tend to be more cautious, while those who
are risk-neutral will tend to take more chances in litigation. Id.
107. Marshall J. Breger, Compensation Formulas for Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 47 LAw &
CON rEMP. PROBS. 249, 249 (1984) (concluding that the theory of "prevailing" market rates
leads to excessive fees).
108. Id. See also Charles Silver, Incoherence and Irrationality in the Law of Attorneys'Fees, 12
REv. Lrnc. 301, 306 (1993) (arguing that the Justices have acted contrary to congressional
mandates to use fee awards to encourage private enforcement of public laws).
109. See Zagrans, supra note 49, at 502-03.
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ies. 110 Moreover, fee-shifting allows the civil rights bar to walk away with
far more money than do the aggrieved plaintiffs.1 1 ' Opponents of fee-
shifting also argue that in order to be eligible for higher fee awards, attor-
neys are more likely to proceed to trial than to engage in meaningful set-
tlement discussions. 112  In a report to Congress made in 1984, The
National Association of Attorneys General succinctly concluded:
Rather than simply facilitating access to the courts for disadvan-
taged victims of civil rights violations, a purpose that the Associa-
tion wholeheartedly endorses, the Act has had the unintended
effects of encouraging frivolous non-civil rights claims, deterring
settlement of meritorious claims, awarding fees to plaintiffs who
do not actually prevail, conferring unreasonable 'windfall' fees
on plaintiffs' counsel, draining public treasuries, and fostering an
avalanche of litigation on attorney's fees that threatens to bury
the underlying civil rights claims that the Act was intended to
vindicate. 1"
3
Unfortunately, little hard data exists upon which to base sound con-
clusions about the efficacy of existing fee-shifting statutes. 114 Although
court records show the dollar value of settlements, judgments, and the
amount of attorney's fees paid,115 there is currently no way to determine
the number of cases that attorneys reject. Furthermore, the reasoning be-
hind an attorney's decision to refuse a case may be a proof problem, a
determination that a particular claim is frivolous, or an unwillingness to
gamble on a fee award. Having precise information about the number of
cases declined, and the reasons therefore, is crucial in evaluating whether
the underlying goal of a particular fee-shifting statute is being met. For
instance, with § 1988, the question is whether meritorious civil rights suits
are encouraged. The lack of information creates an impenetrable barrier
to intelligent discussion.
E. The American Rule and its Progeny
England, the source of much American law, permits winning parties
to recover attorney's fees from opponents. 1" 6 The United States ulti-
110. COMMrIrEE ON THE OFF. OF THE Arr'y GEN., THE NAT'L ASS'N OF ATr'vs GEN.,
AWARDS AGAINST STATE DEFENDANTS UNDER THE CIVL RIGHTS ATTORNEYS' FEES AwARDS AcT 3
(July, 1978).
111. E.g., Rutter, supra note 56, at 36.
112. NATIONAL ASS'N OF ATr'vs GEN., REPORT TO CONGRESS: CVL RIGHTS ArTORNEv'S
FEES AwARDs Acr OF 1976 250 (1984) (recommending Act amendments including incentives
for settlement).
113. Id. See also A. F. Conard, Winnowing Derivative Suits Through Attorneys Fees, 47 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROns. 269, 281 (1984) (examining how fee practices can be used to diminish the
incentive for and provide deterrents to filing of unmeritorious derivative suits).
114. Cf Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 13, at 3 (reporting results of an empirical study
on constitutional tort litigation).
115. Id. at 14-17; see also HERBERT B. NEWBERG, ATTORNEY FEE AwARDs § 10.06 (1986 &
Supp. 1989).
116. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-20 (1967)
(describing the history of awards of attorney's fees in England and America).
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mately disavowed the "English Rule."1 17 Under the "American Rule," win-
ners pay their own litigation fees and costs."1 8
The American Rule persists because it ostensibly encourages the pur-
suit of legitimate claims without the risk of paying an adversary's fees and
costs.1 19 Supporters of the American Rule also argue that a marriage be-
tween the English Rule and the American legal system would lead to litiga-
tion over attorney's fees.120 This concern finds ample support in the spate
of suits spawned by the enactment of § 1988.121 Critics of the American
Rule argue that it is patently unfair to require an injured party to incur
legal fees and costs because someone else behaved badly. 122 Moreover,
under the American Rule, those without funds cannot afford to pursue
their claims.
123
The American Rule is not absolute. For example, parties may con-
tractually agree to shift attorney's fees.' 24 Or, as with § 1988, fee-shifting
can be provided for by statute. Some judge-made exceptions, such as the
"common fund," allocate fees and costs among those who benefit from a
suit brought by others.12 5 In addition, courts may use their equitable pow-
ers to order those acting in bad faith to pay attorney's fees.
12 6
The most enterprising judge-made exception to the American Rule
was the short-lived "private attorney general" doctrine. Under this excep-
tion, judges presiding over public interest cases awarded reasonable attor-
ney's fees to prevailing parties in the absence of any previously recognized
exception. 127 The impetus for the private attorney general doctrine was
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises128 which interpreted the fee-shifting provi-
sion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.129
The fee-shifting statute in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, upon which
§ 1988 was later modeled,' 3 0 provides that a trial court may, in its discre-
117.. 1d. at 717-18. See alsoJohn Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney
Fee Recovey, 47 LAw & CoNTEmP. PRons. 9 (1984). Professor Leubsdorf argues that the Ameri-
can Rule emerged as a "rough compromise" allowing American lawyers to collect large fees
from their clients while permitting the restrictions on cost recovery to remain "as a symbolic
vestige of the old regulatory approach." Id. at 16. Professor Leubsdorf's article provides an
excellent summary of the legislative and judicial history of attorneys' fees in the United
States.
118. Fleischman, 386 U.S. at 717-18.
119. Id. at 718.
120. Id.
121. 2 ScuwAR-rz & KnuuN, supra note 8, § 17.5.
122. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CA. L.
Rav. 792 (1966).
123. Id. at 792-98.
124. See Kent M. Krdys, Comment, The United States Supreme Court: Making Civil Rights
Litigation "Fees-ible" in City of Riverside v. Rivera, 8 U. BRIDGEPORT L REV. 255, 259 n.20
(1987).
125. Feischmann, 386 U.S. at 719; see also Krudys, supra note 124, at 255, 259 n.20 (1987).
126. Krudys, supra note 124, at 259.
127. Mary F. Derfner, Note, One Giant Step: The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976, 21 ST. Louis U. L.J. 441, 442-45 (1977).
128. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1988).
130. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5912.
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tion, award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party.15 1 In New-
man, the Court liberally interpreted "discretion" as requiring the award of
attorney's fees "unless special circumstances would render such an award
unjust."13 2 The holding effectively nullified any meaningful exercise of
discretion by the trial court. The Court reasoned that a contrary holding
would adversely affect the public interest because few victims of racial dis-
crimination were wealthy enough to pursue claims under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 .1as Courts construe the "special circumstances" requirement
narrowly and it is, therefore, rarely applied.
13 4
Arguing that Newman permitted awards of attorney's fees when fur-
thering the public interest through private enforcement, lower courts be-
gan liberally awarding fees in public interest cases in the absence of any
other recognized exception to the American Rule.13 5 Simultaneously,
Congress frequently included fee-shifting provisions when enacting new
public interest legislation.'
3 6
The private attorney general doctrine died as quickly as it was born.
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,' 3 7 an environmental case,
sounded the death knell. The Court held that only Congress, not the judi-
ciary, could shift fees.13 8 After Alyeska, the private attorney general doc-
trine was officially dead.
F. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976
Alyeska created a serious problem for civil rights litigants and their
attorneys. In actions brought under older legislation, without fee-shifting
provisions such as § 1983, courts could not award attorney's fees. How-
ever, if a modern statute with a fee-shifting provision was applicable, attor-
ney's fees could be recovered. 13 9 Congress promptly responded to this
inequity by enacting the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976,
giving trial courts the discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees to pre-
vailing parties in lawsuits brought under specifically enumerated civil
rights statutes.
140
Based on Congress' recognition that limited resources prevented the
executive branch from prosecuting every potential civil rights claim, 14 1 the
legislative history of § 1988 emphasized the need to encourage private civil
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1988).
132. Newman, 390 U.S. at 402.
133. Id.
134. 2 NAHMOD, supra note 89, § 10.02 (noting that special circumstances do not include,
inter alia, where the defendant acted in good faith, the prevailing plaintiff could afford to
pay attorney's fees, or the plaintiff was drunk at the time of beating by police); cf. NEWBERG,
supra note 115, § 10.02 (noting that fee awards have been denied where broad public interest
not offended by defendant's conduct) (citing Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979)).
135. Derfner, supra note 127, at 443.
136. I. at 443-44.
137. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
138. Id. at 269-71.
139. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5911-12.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. III 1989-92).
141. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5. at 4-6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. at 5911-13.
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rights enforcement by awarding attorney's fees. 142 Fee awards under
§ 1988 were to be adjudicated by the same liberal standards used in other
federal litigation arenas, even where the rights in question were not neces-
sarily pecuniary in nature.1 43 Citing Newman as the paradigm for deter-
mining when fees should be awarded, 144 Congress made clear that
awarding fees should be the rule rather than the exception. Section 1988
needed to attract competent counsel through adequate compensation
without creating a financial "windfall."
145
Because Congress regarded fee-shifting statutes containing similar
language to be interpreted in the same fashion, courts freely applied hold-
ings from cases brought under one statute to the statute at issue.
146
Therefore, precedent existed for interpreting § 1988 upon enactment.
Despite this body of interpretative law, the import of "prevailing party"
and "reasonable attorney's fees" under § 1988 is frequently litigated.
147
G. Prevailing Party
Under § 1988 courts award attorney's fees only to prevailing parties.
Prevailing party status requires success on the merits.1 48 Procedural victo-
ries alone are insufficient for the purposes of § 1988.149 While this ap-
pears straightforward, litigators know that it is not always so easy to
determine who "prevailed" on the merits. Prevailing party status has been
litigated, inter alia, when the case became moot because of a defendant's
voluntary act in response to being sued (known as the catalyst theory),
150
where the plaintiff was unable to take advantage of any potential relief,
151
or where the plaintiff prevailed on an interlocutory decision and sought
attorney's fees pendente lite 52 Some defendants argued that their success-
142. S. Rep. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 2-4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. at 5909-11. Op-
ponents of the proposed Act argued that lawsuits generally arise where there is a genuine
dispute; therefore, it would be inequitable for the losing party to pay an adversary's attorney's
fees; see also Awarding of Attorney's Fees: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1975)
(statement of Rex E. Lee, Asst. Att'y Gen.).
143. S. Rep. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913.
144. S. Rep. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5912.
145. S. Rep. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913.
146. S. Rep. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. at 5912; see also
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 691-92 (1983) ("[W]e held that similar attorney's fee
provisions should be interpreted pai passu .... ").
147. See 2 ScHwAR-rz & KiRKUN, supra note 8, § 17.5.
148. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 759-64 (1987) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, & Ste-
vens, JJ., dissenting) (issue of a favorable judicial statement during pendency of litigation,
without more, is not the equivalent of success on the merits); Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446
U.S. 754, 756-59 (1980) (per curiam) (granting only a new trial does not create prevailing
party status under § 1988).
149. Hanrahan, 446 U.S. at 759.
150. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279-80 (1st Cir. 1978).
151. Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (per curiam) (Brennan, Marshall, & Black-
mun, JJ., dissenting) (holding that an affirmative declaratory judgment issued after claims
were mooted cannot create prevailing party status where parties are unable to take advantage
of the relief).
152. Ramos v. Lamm, 632 F. Supp. 376, 389 n.10 (D. Colo. 1986) (awarding interim fees
on the merits during lengthy litigation of prison conditions).
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ful opposition resulted in prevailing party status entitling them to attor-
ney's fees. 153 Understandably, however, the most difficult decisions for
courts are those in which the plaintiff wins only a portion of the relief
sought.
154
Noting that the legislative history of § 1988 provides little guidance
where success is limited, the Court implied that "prevailing party" should
be liberally construed' 5 5 as the First Circuit held in Nadeau v. Helgemoe,
156
requiring success only on "any significant issue." 157 Despite the Court's
apparent inclination towards the expansive Nadeau test, some circuits con-
tinued to apply the narrower "central issue" test to ascertain prevailing
party status.' 58 Under the "central issue" test, a plaintiff obtains prevailing
party status only when acquiring "the primary relief sought."' 5 9 Ulti-
mately, in Texas Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent School District,160 the
Court unanimously adopted the Nadeau test.161 "[P]laintiffs may be consid-
ered 'prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any
significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit... sought
in bringing suit... [thus] cross[ing] the threshold to a fee award of some
kind."' 62 However, the Court muddied the waters by stating that a techni-
cal or de minimis victory does not satisfy the "any significant issue" test.
16 3
Because of the ambiguity in Garland, the preexisting split among the cir-
cuits continued unabated over whether an award of nominal damages cre-
ated prevailing party status. 164 One of the cases, Romberg v. Nichols,165 is
153. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (holding that pre-
vailing defendant is entitled to award of attorney's fees in a Title VII case if plaintiffs acts are
frivolous or unreasonable even where suit not brought in bad faith).
154. See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (plurality opinion),(Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, CJ., White & O'Connor, JJ.) (plaintiffs prevailing
parties and entitled to full fee award under § 1988 despite verdicts against only 6 of 32 de-
fendants); Rogers v. Kelly, 866 F.2d 997, 1001 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding reduction of award
of attorney's fees where plaintiff succeeded only on due process claim and received $1 in
nominal damages); Nephew v. City of Aurora, 830 F.2d 1547, 1550-51 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 976 (1988) (plaintiffs prevailing parties where only two of four plaintiffs won
nominal damages but fees reduced to reflect level of success).
155. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1983) (dictum).
156. 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978).
157. Hens/ey, 461 U.S. at 433 (quoting Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)).
158. See, e.g., Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 837 F.2d 190, 192
(5th Cir. 1988) (holding that test for prevailing party status under § 1988 is whether plaintiff
prevailed on "central issue" for which relief was sought), rev'd, 489 U.S. 782 (1989).
159. Id. (quoting Simien v. City of San Antonio, 809 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 1987)).
160. 489 U.S. 782 (1989).
161. Id. at 790-93. (awarding prevailing party status where plaintiffs failed to gain union
access to campuses during school hours but won free speech claims).
162. Id. at 792-93 (quoting Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 278-79 (1st. Cir. 1978)).
163. Id. at 792.
164. See, e.g., Romberg v. Nichols, 970 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding fee award by
finding prevailing party status where plaintiffs awarded nominal damages for violation of
Fourth Amendment), cert. granted and vacated, 113 S. Ct. 1038 (1993) (remanded for further
consideration in light ofFarrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992)); Ruggiero v. Krzeminski, 928
F.2d 558, 564 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding prevailing party status where plaintiffs awarded only
nominal damages for violations of First and Fourteenth Amendments); Scofield v. City of
Hillsborough, 862 F.2d 759, 766 (9th Cir. 1988) (ordering a finding of prevailing party status
and award of nominal damages if due process violation found after remand); Coleman v.
Turner, 838 F.2d 1004, 1005 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding prevailing party status where plaintiffs
won one of five asserted claims and received only nominal damages); Nephew v. City of
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also notable for the trial court's suggestion that plaintiff's counsel, sensing
defeat, requested only nominal damages in closing arguments solely to
cross the threshold for an award of attorney's fees.
16
H. Reasonable Attorney's Fees
After determining prevailing party status, the trial court calculates a
reasonable fee. When Congress enacted § 1988, the Senate report stated
that courts should consider the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc.16 7 in arriving at a reasonable fee:168 (1) the time and
labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the legal questions, (3) the
skill needed to adequately represent the client, (4) the preclusion of other
employment by the attorney by accepting the case, (5) the customary fee,
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by
the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results
obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10)
the undesirability of the case and the effect on the attorney's reputation
for accepting a certain case, (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. 169
The subjective Johnson guidelines proved unsatisfactory. 170 In re-
sponse, the Court adopted the Third Circuit's more objective "lodestar"
approach.1 71 The Court eventually subsumed the Johnson factors into the
"lodestar" calculation, 172 which begins by multiplying "the number of
hours reasonably expended" by a "reasonable hourly rate."173 The trial
court may then adjust the lodestar figure upward or downward depending
on the facts.174 The party seeking an award of attorney's fees must submit
documentation of the hours worked and the desired rate. If the court
Aurora, 830 F.2d 1547 (10th Cir. 1987) (prevailing party status where only nominal damages
awarded), cert. denied 485 U.S. 976 (1988); Garner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 807 F.2d 1536,
1539 (11 th Cir. 1987) (finding prevailing party status where only nominal damages awarded).
Cf Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 662 (4th Cir. 1990) (dictum) (arguing that
nominal damages are de minimis; therefore, prevailing party status not created) (citing Texas
State Teachers Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 792 (5th Cir. 1988)).
165. 970 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1992).
166. Id. at 520-21. This course of action, if true, raises some significant ethical issues.
167. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
168. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913. In addi-
tion, the Senate cited several cases as appropriate applications of the Johnson factors. Id. See
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Stanford Daily
v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affld, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
169. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19.
170. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 563
(1986) (noting that the Johnson factors provided little "actual guidance" to district courts),
rev'd on reh'g, 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
171. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, &
Stevens, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although not expressly cited by
Hensey, the lodestar test was formulated in Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 166-68 (3d Cir. 1973).
172. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984).
173. Hensey, 461 U.S. at 433.
174. Id. at 434.
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determines that the request for fees lacks sufficient documentation or is
excessive, the fee is reduced. 175 Hens/ey also addressed the issue of fee
awards for work on unsuccessful claims, concluding that courts should be-
gin their analysis by asking: (1) whether the claims were unrelated to the
successful claims; and (2) whether the plaintiff was successful enough to
make the lodestar amount a reasonable basis for the award. 1 76 Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, concluded that Congress' emphasis on
"prevailing party" meant there was no intent to make an award if the plain-
tiff failed to prevail on unrelated claims. 177 Additionally, if a plaintiff
failed to prevail on related claims, even where such claims were not frivo-
lous or made in bad faith, the lodestar amount may still be too high.178
The Court stated that attorney's fees should not be reduced simply be-
cause the plaintiff failed to prevail on all legal theories advanced, but also
strongly emphasized that "[t]he result is what matters."1 79 Hensley also re-
quired lower courts to demonstrate that they considered the relationship
between the results obtained and the size of the award.' 8 0
Although the lodestar approach appeared more objective than the
twelve Johnson factors, numerous disputes emerged over upward and
downward adjustments to the lodestar, the disproportionality of fees to
monetary damages, the quality of representation, the risk undertaken by
plaintiff's counsel, the market rate, and delays in fee payment. 18 1 In one
significant decision, the Court rejected contingent fee agreements be-
tween plaintiffs and their attorneys as caps on the size of the fee award.
18 2
In another landmark opinion, City of Riverside v. Rivera,183 a plurality re-
jected a proportionality approach,18 4 upholding the lower court's award
of $245,456 in attorney's fees where plaintiffs were awarded $33,350 in
damages.' 8 5 The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs successfully furthered
the public interest by exposing the police department's racially discrimina-
tory policies.' 86 The Court then reiterated Congress' intent to use § 1988
to attract competent attorneys to vindicate individual rights, thereby fur-
thering the public interest.'
8 7
175. Id. at 433-34.
176. Id at 434.
177. Id. at 435.
178. Id. at 436.
179. Id at 435.
180. Id. at 437.
181. See generally 2 Scw~A rz & KiRKUN, supra note 8, §§ 22-23.
182. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 91-96 (1989). Note that this ruling abrogates
one Johnson factor.
183. 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (plurality opinion).
184. Id. at 574.
185. Id. at 567.
186. Id at 574, 567-73.
187. Id. at 574-80.
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II. FARRAR v. HoBB 188
A. Facts
Joseph Farrar and his son, Dale Farrar, owned and operated ajuvenile
home and school, Artesia Hall, for "delinquent, disabled and disturbed
teens."18 9 After the death of a student in 1973, a grand jury returned a
murder indictment against Joseph Farrar. Mr. Farrar was charged with
willfully failing to administer medical treatment and failing to provide for
timely hospitalization. 190 The State of Texas also obtained a temporary
injunction and closed Artesia Hall. 19 1 Respondent William Hobby was
then the Lieutenant Governor of Texas. Hobby publicly criticized the
Texas Department of Public Welfare, particularly its licensing proce-
dures.19 2 In addition, Hobby personally urged the director of the Depart-
ment of Public Welfare to investigate Artesia Hall. 19 3 Hobby also
accompanied the Governor on an inspection of Artesia Hall. 19 4 Finally,
Hobby attended the hearing on the temporary injunction, later speaking
with reporters. Although the criminal charges against Farrar were ulti-
mately dropped, his reputation and his business remained impaired. 195
B. Procedural History
Farrar sued Hobby and other state officials for relief under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983 and 1985, alleging a conspiracy to institute a malicious prosecu-
tion to deprive him of liberty and property without due process, seeking a
monumental $17 million in damages. 19 6 Joseph Farrar died several
months before trial. Dale Farrar and Pat Smith, co-administrators of
Joseph Farrar's estate, were substituted as plaintiffs.
197
Ajury trial was held in 1983.198 Through special interrogatories, the
jury found that all the defendants, except Hobby, conspired against Far-
rar, but that the conspiracy was not a proximate cause of any injury.199
The jury also found that Hobby deprived Farrar of his constitutional rights
under § 1983, but this conduct, likewise, was not a proximate cause of any
injury.20 0 No damages were awarded, and the district court ordered the
parties to pay their own costs.
20 '
Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the portion of the verdict disallowing any award against the con-
188, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).




193. Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311, 1312 (5th Cir. 1991), affd sub noma Farrar v.
Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).










spirators because there was no proof of a deprivation of a constitutional
right.20 2 However, based on the jury's verdict that Hobby violated Joseph
Farrar's civil rights, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case for entry of judg-
ment against Hobby for nominal damages of $1.203
The plaintiffs then sought attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.204
The district court awarded the plaintiffs a total of $317,662 in fees, costs,
and interest. 20 5 Understandably, Hobby appealed. A divided Fifth Circuit
reversed the award, holding that plaintiffs awarded only nominal damages
cannot be prevailing parties under § 1988 and are, therefore, ineligible for
attorney's fees awards.
20 6
C. The Majority Opinion
The Court granted certiorari to determine (1) whether a plaintiff
awarded only nominal damages is a prevailing party, eligible for an award
of attorney's fees under § 1988, and (2) whether such a prevailing party is
entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.20 7 Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Scalia, and Kennedy joined Justice Thomas's opinion. Justice O'Connor
also wrote a separate concurrence.
1. Prevailing Party
The Court began by reviewing three of its prior cases,20 8 concluding
that a plaintiff prevails when "actual relief on the merits of his claim mate-
rially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the
defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff."2° 9 The
Court held that the amount of the award is insignificant in determining
prevailing party status. 2 10 Instead, there must be a material alteration of
the legal relationship between the parties, which can occur only where
there is an enforceable judgment, consent decree or settlement against
the defendant. 21' The Court then held that the Farrar plaintiffs prevailed
because they received an award of damages, albeit only $1, instead of the
$17 million sought.
2 12
2. Reasonableness of the Award
That $1 became very significant in the calculation of reasonable attor-
ney's fees. The Court ruled that prevailing party status is a necessary, but
202. Farrar v. Cain, 756 F.2d 1148, 1151-52 (5th Cir. 1985).
203. Id. at 1152. See supra notes 155-65 and accompanying text.
204. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566, 570 (1992).
205. Id.
206. Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1991), af.'d sub nom., 113 S. Ct. 566
(1992).
207. See Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. at 570, 574, 579.
208. Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989); Rhodes
v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1 (1988); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987).
209. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. at 573.
210. Id. at 574.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 575.
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insufficient, basis on which to award an attorney's fee.2 13 Instead, the crit-
ical inquiry is the amount of damages sought as compared to the amount
of damages awarded. 2 14 The Court concluded that because nominal dam-
ages are awarded only where there is a failure to prove a compensable
injury, "the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all."215 In light of the
more than $300,000 fee award made by the district court, the majority felt
obliged to chide the lower court for ignoring precedent and awarding a
fee "windfall."2 16 The Court also expressly relaxed the Hensley require-
ment that courts perform a lodestar calculation or enumerate the Johnson
factors when the disparity between the amounts sought and awarded is so
great that any award is precluded, or where only a very low award should
be made.
2 17
D. The O'Connor Concurrence
Noting the confusion among the circuits as to the effect of a technical
or de minimis victory, as discussed in Texas State Teachers Ass', Justice
O'Connor explained that Farrar correctly held that a technical victory is
adequate for prevailing party status, but the victory may be so limited that
it fails to support any award of attorney's fees.218 Harking back to New-
man, O'Connor viewed nominal damages as the sort of special circum-
stance that prevents the award of attorney's fees.
219
Justice O'Connor also argued that the enactment of § 1988 was never
intended to award fees to "pyrrhic victors." 220 Pointing out that the lan-
guage of § 1988 states that attorney's fees are considered costs, she ex-
plained that Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits the
award of costs where only a technical victory is achieved.
22 1
In addition, Justice O'Connor substantially enhanced the analytic
framework provided in the majority opinion for determining a reasonable
fee where only nominal damages are awarded. In addition to evaluating
the difference between the amount sought and that actually awarded, Jus-
tice O'Connor contended that courts should also consider: (1) the impor-
tance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed or (2) whether any
public service, such as deterring future unconstitutional conduct, resulted
from the lawsuit.22 2 In applying these tests to the facts in Farrar,
O'Connor determined neither of these additional requirements were ful-
filled. Describing Farrar's victory as "hollow" because he prevailed against
only one of six defendants, O'Connor declared that no important legal
213. Id. at 574-75.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 575.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 576.
219. IM. at 576-77.
220. Id. at 577. A pyrrhic victory is "a victory won at excessive coSL" WEBSTER'S NEw
COLLEGIATE DIcIoNARY 941 (1977).
221. Farrar at 577-78. Confusion has persisted for hundreds of years as to whether attor-
ney's fees should be considered costs. See Leubsdorf, supra note 117, at 10-17.
222. Id. at 578-79.
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issue was addressed. 223 Moreover, because the interrogatories sent to the
jury lacked specificity, no basis existed for understanding how Hobby vio-
lated Farrar's rights. Therefore, there could be no meaningful
deterrence.
224
E. The Concurrence and the Dissent
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and SouterjoinedJustice White's concur-
rence and dissent. All agreed with the majority's holding that those
awarded nominal damages are prevailing parties. 225 However, they dis-
agreed with the majority's conclusion that nominal damages should usu-
ally preclude any fee award. Justice White argued that the Court did not
grant certiorari on the issue of the reasonableness of the fee and that the
parties did not brief or argue that question.226 Justice White also argued
that the complexity of civil rights litigation places the trial court in the best
position to fashion the appropriate fee. 2 27 The Court should not expend
its limited resources determining a reasonable fee. Instead, the case
should have been remanded to the district court for reconsideration of
the fee in accordance with precedent.
228
III. SUBSEQUENT CASES
A determination of Farrar's actual impact will only be possible after
the lower courts wrestle with and apply the holdings. Because the decision
is relatively recent only a few courts have applied Farrar. However, some of
the more interesting approaches are discussed below.
A. Only Nominal Damages Awarded
In Gilmore v. Gregg,2 29 ajury found in the plaintiffs favor on a § 1983
claim based on excessive force but awarded only nominal damages instead
of the more than one million dollars sought in compensatory and punitive
damages. The court applied Farrar and easily determined prevailing party
status. However, instead of applying the majority's test with respect to the
reasonableness of fees, the court used Justice O'Connor's concurrence.
The court reasoned that a significant public interest was served by warning
police officers not to engage in excessive force. After considering the de-
gree of success attained, the court reduced the fee from the requested
$60,000 to $4,875.230
One month later, faced with a similar fact pattern, a different Kansas
District Court judge refused to make any award of attorney's fees where
223. I& at 578.
224. Id. at 578-79.
225. Id. at 579.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 579-80.
228. Id. at 580.
229. No. CIV.A.91-2247-EEO, 1993 WL 339918 (D. Kan. Aug. 23, 1993).
230. Id. at *2.
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only nominal damages were awarded. 23 1 The basis for the failure to make
the award is unclear. The court indicated that it would exercise its discre-
tion and withhold any award even if some sort of fee award appears
reasonable.
232
In yet another prisoner case, a police dog bit the plaintiff.23 3 The
prisoner received only nominal damages at trial. In discussing Farrar, the
trial court determined that recovering only nominal damages is not an
absolute bar to a full or partial fee award.23 4 Without expressly articulat-
ing the test injustice O'Connor's concurrence, the court determined that
the suit resulted in positive changes in the jail. 235 The court then went on
to categorize the amount of time the attorneys spent on the case as exces-
sive, particularly in light of the low degree of success attained.23 6 The
court was particularly upset that punitive damages were never requested
despite a factual basis for such a claim. A total of $1,500 in attorneys' fees
was awarded, a reduction of more than $25,000.23
7
In an unreported wrongful discharge case, Koopman v. Water Dist. No.
1,238 a jury found the deprivation of a property interest without due pro-
cess. However, because the plaintiff would have been discharged even if
the administrative process passed constitutional muster, only nominal
damages were awarded. Finding the facts directly on point with Farrar, the
district court refused to award any attorney's fees.
23 9
In Rogers v. Board of Trustees,24° the plaintiff received only $1 in nomi-
nal damages where a procedural due process violation occurred but, as in
Koopman, the plaintiff would have been discharged anyway. However, un-
like Koopman and Farrar, the city's administrative procedures were com-
pletely revamped as a direct result of the lawsuit.24 1 Apparently finding
the Farrar majority without sufficient guidance, the court applied justice
O'Connor's three-pronged test. Relying on the trial court's findings that
Rogers achieved a "clear and unambiguous vindication" of his claim and
also performed a public service resulting in substantive changes in admin-
istrative procedures, the court found Rogers entitled to an award of attor-
ney's fees under § 1988.242
B. Nominal or Low Damages Awarded in Conjunction with Other Relief
In Loggins v. Delo2 43 prison officials placed an inmate in disciplinary
detention after they determined that he mailed an outgoing obscene let-
231. Korlie v. Lundin, No. CIV.A.91-4040-DES, 1993 WL 347804 (D. Kan. Sept. 13, 1993).
232. Id. at *2.
233. Dillenbeck v. Hayes, No. 90-CV-758, 1993 WL 370567 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1993).
234. Id. at *2.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at *1, *3.
238. No. Civ.A.88-2573-GTV, 1993 WL 112990 (D. Kan. Mar. 16, 1993).
239. Id. at *2.
240. 859 P.2d 284 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
241. Id. at 288.
242. Id. at 288-89.
243. 999 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1993).
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ter in violation of a prison rule.244 At trial, the prisoner was awarded
$102.50 in actual damages but failed to obtain punitive damages. The
court also ordered the conduct violation expunged from the prisoner's
record. Pursuant to § 1988, plaintiff requested $34,968 in attorney's fees.
The court. reduced the fee to $25,000.245 The defendants argued that Far-
rar precluded any fee award. The court determined that because injunc-
tive relief was also ordered, Farrar did not operate as a bar to an award.
246
However, because success was limited, the fee reduction was upheld, par-
tially on the basis of Farrar.
2 4 7
C. Application of the Catalyst Doctrine
When the catalyst theory is applied, there is no judgment on the mer-
its of the case. Instead, a defendant changes his behavior as a direct result
of the filing of a lawsuit.2 48 However, Farrar's description of prevailing
party2 49 raises questions about the continuing vitality of the catalyst doc-
trine as a basis for prevailing party status.
250
After Farrar, the Fifth Circuit applied the catalyst doctrine in a case
involving living conditions at ajail.25 1 The complaining prisoners failed to
obtain either declaratory or monetary relief. However, the court found
that changes in jail conditions occurred as a direct result of the lawsuit
making the prisoners prevailing parties eligible for a fee award.
252
In S-I v. State Board of Education of North Carolina,25 3 the court upheld
an award of attorney's fees under the catalyst theory several years after the
case was voluntarily dismissed.254 The dissent was apoplectic, arguing that
Farrar clearly did away with the catalyst doctrine.
255
Following a different path, one district court, in Cady v. City of Chi-
cago,256 found that the plaintiffs filing of a lawsuit was a catalyst in the
244. Id. at 365.
245. Id. at 367-68.
246. Id. at 369.
247. Id. at 370.
248. American Council of the Blind v. Romer, 992 F.2d 249, 250 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 184 (1993).
249. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992). To prevail requires a material alteration of
the legal relationship between the parties, which can only occur where there is an enforcea-
ble judgment, consent decree or settlement against the defendant. Id. at 574.
250. American Council of the Blind, 992 F.2d at 251. The court questioned the state of the
law after Farrar
Perhaps it could be argued that in light of Farrar the "catalyst rule" should only be
applied to the reasonable attorney's fee prong of § 1981 and not to the prevailing
party prong. If such should be the case and our adherence to and application of
the "catalyst rule" . . . is not acceptable in the determination of a prevailing party
under § 1988 in this nonjudgment environment. . . we believe that the "catalyst
rule" should then be applicable in both of its prongs to the reasonable attorney's
fee prong of § 1988.
Id.
251. Pembroke v. Wood County, 981 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1993).
252. Id. at 230-31.
253. No. 92-1525, 1993 WL 365696 (4th Cir. Sept. 21, 1993).
254. Id. at *5-*6.
255. Id. at *9-*10.
256. No. 92-C-7932, 1993 WL 326840 (N.D. Ill. E.D. Aug. 25, 1993).
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defendant's change in behavior. However, because defendant removed
the speech forum, instead of letting the plaintiff participate, the court
found an insufficient basis to award attorney's fees as in Farrar. Even
though the court found that the plaintiff advanced the public good in
triggering defendants' abandonment of an unconstitutional course of con-
duct, the court refused to find prevailing party status.
25 7
IV. ANALYSIS
The legal climate underwent a sea change during Farrar's pendency.
The case was filed in 1973 when many sectors of the country encouraged
the courts and Congress to provide broad protection of civil rights.
25 8
The Court decided the case in 1992 at a time of profound disagreement as
to the efficacy of continuing to enforce civil rights through expensive and
lengthy litigation. Critics, understandably concerned by financial and ju-
dicial efficiency, are calling for retrenchment. 25 9 Some view fee-shifting as
creating more problems than it solves.
260
To enable private citizens to vindicate their rights, § 1988 was
designed to encourage private attorneys, through fee awards, to accept
civil rights cases.261 Shortly after the enactment of § 1988, the Court, al-
beit with a significantly different bench, assumed that attorney's fees could
be awarded where only nominal damages are obtained.2 62 The Farrar
Court now holds that not a penny should be paid to vindicate civil rights
in the absence of a compensable injury.
A. Inadequate Statutory Interpretation
Congress never intended the statute to compensate only those attor-
neys able to secure substantial sums of money for their clients. Nothing in
the text of § 1988, or in the legislative history, indicates that a prevailing
party should be denied attorney's fees in the absence of special circum-
stances. And, "special circumstances" has never been construed as the ab-
sence of a compensable injury.2 63 The Court misdirects its attention by
emphasizing the degree of harm suffered by the plaintiff. Instead, the
focus should be where Congress intended it to be-on the state actor's
misconduct. Regrettably, both the majority and Justice O'Connor's con-
currence failed to adequately distinguish between "compensable injuries"
and "reasonable attorney's fees." While each costs the defendant money,
they serve distinctly different goals. Monetary damages are intended to
compensate the plaintiff for the actual harm caused by the deprivation.
257. Id. at *1.
258. See, e.g., Derfner, supra note 127 (summarizing the history and events leading up to
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976).
259. Zagrans, supra note 49 (proposing changes in construction and use of § 1983 to limit
actionable deprivation to where offending conduct authorized by state law or custom).
260. See NAT'L Ass'N OF A-rr'vs GEN., supra note 112, at 250.
261. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 3-5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN. at 5910-13 and
accompanying text.
262. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.ll (1978).
263. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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Awards of attorney's fees entice competent attorneys to accept civil rights
cases.
2 64
In reaching its decision, the majority is guilty of overreaching. As
pointed out by the dissent, a substantial body of case law exists to guide
lower courts in calculating a reasonable attorney's fee.265 Here, however,
the fee-awarding court failed to make any adjustments as required by Hens-
Ley,266 clearly an abuse of discretion. In particular, the district court
should have considered the failure to prevail on unrelated claims and the
apparent lack of public service.
While uncontroverted that the degree of success plays a substantial
role in determining a reasonable attorney's fee, success should not be the
sole determinative factor. 267 Farrar's emphasis on the disparity between
the amount sought and that obtained 2 68 is only an extreme form of the
proportionality approach rejected in City of Riverside.269 In conjunction
with this singular focus on the bottom line, the Farrar Court implied that
Hensley and Johnson calculations waste time unnecessarily where a court has
predetermined that no fee or only a very low fee should be awarded. 270 It
seems patently unjust that after prevailing in a complex and time-consum-
ing suit, attorneys are written off with a sentence or two. More impor-
tandy, if lower courts no longer perform a lodestar calculation, or any
other analytical steps, how is it possible to determine what a reasonable fee
should be? In essence, the Farrar court tacitly approved ad hoc judicial
determinations of attorney's fees. But, cases where only nominal damages
are awarded raise difficult questions, requiring a careful balancing of a
number of factors. Discarding the evaluation process as inefficient flatly
contradicts the legislative and judicial history of § 1988.
Moreover, the dissent correctly points out that the parties briefed
only the prevailing party issue, not the reasonableness of the fee itself.
Commentators, in addition to the parties, also predicted that the Farrar
decision would turn on the definition of "prevailing party."27 1 The Court
should not have addressed the reasonableness of the fee itself without giv-
ing the parties the opportunity to brief the numerous issues involved in
264. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 3-5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5910-13 and
accompanying text.
265. For a historical overview and detailed discussion of pertinent § 1988 case law, see 2
SCHWARrz & KIRKUN, supra note 8 §§ 17.1 - 17.4.
266. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
267. SeeS. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5 at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5912-13; see
also text at 9-10; Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94-96 (1986). "If a contingent-fee agree-
ment were to govern as a strict limitation on the award of attorney's fees, an undesirable
emphasis might be placed on the importance of the recovery of damages in civil rights litiga-
tion." Id. at 95; cf. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983) ("The result is what mat-
ters."). Id. at 435.
268. Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 574.
269. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986) (plurality opinion).
270. Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 575.
271. SeeJ.G. Caillier, Recent Developments, Estate of Farrar v. Cain: When the Winning
Party is not the Prevailing Party, 66 TUL. L. Rrv. 2067 (1992); William N. Warren, Note, Estate
of Farrar v. Cain: "It's not the Money-It's the Principle of the Thing," 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 621
(1992); James D. Weiss, Note, Nominal Damages, Nominal Victory: Estate of Farrar v. Cain's
Improper Limit on Awards of Attorneys'Fees Under § 1988, 76 MiNN. L. REv. 1251 (1992).
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determining a reasonable fee. In addition, § 1988 leaves this decision to
the discretion of the trial court.
B. Lack of Clarity in the Farrar Rationale
In holding that the only reasonable fee is "usually" no fee,2 72 the
Court fails to provide any definition of "usually." Not even the slightest
whisper of dicta offers lower courts any standard by which to make a deter-
mination. This paucity of guidance can only result in confusion among
the lower courts as they attempt to determine if the case before them is
'usual" or "unusual." Undoubtedly, this will lead to litigation, creating still
more delays and expense.
The three-pronged test discussed in' Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence273 is more helpful than the flat pronouncement of the majority and
also finds support in the legislative history and case law. However, her
outright dismissal of the importance of the vindication of civil rights is
troublesome. If United States Supreme Court justices continue to mini-
mize the potential seriousness of procedural due process claims, through
narrow rulings on damages and fee awards, little purpose may remain in
litigating these particular civil rights claims.
Equally disturbing is the portion of the opinion holding that legal
relationships can only be altered by enforceable judgments, consent de-
crees or settlements against defendants.2 74 The Court's definition of "pre-
vailing party" ignores the long-standing use of the catalyst doctrine for
determining such status. Courts have awarded attorney's fees where no
enforceable judgement, consent decree or settlement exists but where the
lawsuit was the catalyst or impetus for substantive changes in the defend-
ant's behavior.275 At the very least, the Farrar opinion can be read, and
has been so read, as eliminating the catalyst doctrine for determining pre-
vailing party status.
2 76
For a court that is interested in results, above all else, this is a curious
result. If the prevailing party language of Farrar is narrowly construed,
plaintiffs will be obliged to seek formalization of every behavioral change
by the defendant in order to be eligible for fee awards. Contrarily, defend-
ants will have no incentive to enter into formal agreements because of the
creation of liability for fee awards. The result can only be that some litiga-
tion will be prolonged unnecessarily as the dispute subtly shifts from the
merits of the case to the fee issue. This, in turn, may create a significant
conflict between attorneys and clients. If the client is not personally obli-
272. Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 575.
273. Id. at 578-79.
274. Id. at 574.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 242-51.
276. Seegenerally Pembroke v. Wood County, 981 F.2d 225, 237 n.27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
Wood County v. Pembroke, 113 S. Ct. 2965 (1993) (distinguishing Farrar and applying the
catalyst theory); Kerr v. Vick, 986 F.2d 1421 (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 1993) (arguing that an anomaly
would result if the Farrar standard did not also permit awards of attorneys' fees under the
catalyst theory); American Council of the Blind v. Romer, 992 F.2d 249, 251 (10th Cir. 1993),
cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 184 (1993) (noting that Farrar's effect on the catalyst theory is unclear).
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gated to pay attorney's fees because of the nature of the fee agreement,
and is still able to obtain relief from the defendant, the client would un-
derstandably be uninterested in prolonging litigation simply to ensure
that the attorney be paid.2 77 Alternatively, one can argue that if defend-
ants are aware they can avoid liability for fees by voluntarily changing their
behavior, the absence of fee-shifting would be beneficial to society as a
whole.278 However, because the Farrar decision addressed an extant judg-
ment, the Court did not need to reach this issue. In addition, because
construction and interpretation of the innumerable fee-shifting statutes is
somewhat interchangeable, 2 79 Farrar will impact more than the few stat-
utes enumerated in § 1988.
C. Potential Impact on Civil Rights Litigation
Perhaps the most obvious objection to the Farrar decision is its poten-
tial chilling effect on civil rights litigation. 280 Section 1988 should en-
courage attorneys to accept meritorious civil rights cases. At the onset of a
case, it can be difficult for an attorney to accurately assess the chances of
prevailing. Granted, personal injury attorneys perform this task daily.
However, civil rights litigation can be substantially more complex and,
therefore more protracted, than an automobile accident case. Civil rights
cases tend to involve more legal issues, including thorny issues of defense,
as well as proof problems. In addition, there is generally less innate empa-
thy for civil rights plaintiffs than for personal injury plaintiffs. Juries may
be reluctant to award their own tax dollars to a prisoner who was beaten.
Although attempting to compensate every civil rights injury is not sensible,
after Farrar, some clearly deserving persons may never have the opportu-
nity to make their claims. With the compensable injury aspect of the case
now intertwined with a reasonable fee, minimal injuries, no matter how
egregious the offense, weaken the potential for attorney's fees. These
cases may last for years, as with the nineteen years it took Farrar to traverse
the legal system, and few attorneys or law firms can afford to expend the
time and financial resources necessary to litigate a civil rights case if the
opportunity to recover fees is undermined by the Court. The private attor-
ney general doctrine, while not destroyed as in Alyeska, is jeopardized.
277. This is similar to the situation created by the Court in Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717
(1986), where the Court held that a defendant may demand that a plaintiff waive entitlement
to statutory fees as part of settlement.
278. The plaintiffs attorney will, of course, not benefit by remaining unpaid where plain-
tiffs are unable to pay. This could result in attorneys refusing to accept cases where the
potential plaintiffs are impecunious and likely to remain that way, such as prisoners. In these
situations, a fee agreement would be meaningless.
279. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
280. See Daniel L. Lowery, Comment, "Prevailing Party" Status for Civil Rights Plaintiffs: Fee-
Shing's Shiffing Thrshold, 61 U. CrN. L. REV. 1441 (1993).
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D. What Should be Done?
"A request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major liti-
gation."2 1 As applied, § 1988 grows more and more unworkable. The
Supreme Court alone has issued a substantial number of attorney fee
award rulings under § 1988.282 A cursory review of these cases creates the
temptation to succumb to the argument that the Court wishes to restrict
fee awards to negatively impact civil rights litigation.283 Closer inspection
of the cases reveals that the broad language of fee-shifting statutes can be a
breeding ground for competing interpretations. Members of the court
may loathe awarding attorney's fees to the civil rights bar or they may not.
However, as written, § 1988 and other fee-shifting statutes allow more
scope for individual justices to slant their decisions. But, whatever one's
belief about the court's predisposition, in Farrar, the Court failed to con-
strue the plain meaning of § 1988, opting instead to overemphasize Con-
gress's desire not to award "windfalls."
Relief is needed. Fee-shifting issues overburden plaintiffs, defend-
ants, attorneys, and courts. Some commentators have suggested detailed
and viable changes to § 1988.284 Congress must determine desirable and
realistic goals for the protection of civil rights. Once that analysis is per-
formed, the theoretical implications of different fee-shifting models
should be carefully assessed. As part of its analysis, Congress must gather
and interpret data about the impact of fee-shifting. Only then should
§ 1988 and other fee-shifting statutes be rewritten. As part of that rewrit-
ing, Congress should take special pains with the legislative history it cre-
ates, learning from the lessons of § 1988 as currently enacted.
CONCLUSION
The law surrounding fee-shifting continues to haphazardly evolve
without any noticeable societal benefit. Although not intended by the
94th Congress, fee-shifting places a tremendous burden on plaintiffs, de-
fendants and the legal system. Under a charitable view, Farrar is a mis-
guided judicial attempt to remedy some of the problems. However, as may
281. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
282. In addition to cases already discussed in this Comment, see also City of Burlington
v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992) (no enhancement of the lodestar to offset risk of nonpay-
ment); Kay v. Ehrler, 111 S. CL 1435 (1991) (no fees awarded to attorney who proceeded pro
se); Venegas v. Mitchell, 110 S. Ct. 1679 (1990) (unanimous court enforced a contingent fee
agreement that provided for fees in excess of the statutory fee); Independent Fed'n of Flight
Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) (prevailing parties entitled to fees against interven-
ors only if the intervenors' claims are unreasonable or lack foundation); Pennsylvania v. Dela-
ware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 725 (1987) (Delaware Valley II)
(plurality opinion) (no enhancement to lodestar for risk of loss); Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 566 (1986) (Delaware Valley I) (no
enhancement of lodestar based on quality of representation); Marek v. Chesney 473 U.S. 1
(1985) (prevailing party not entitled to fees for work performed after Rule 68 offer if plaintiff
fails to obtain a better result at trial).
283. See, e.g., Brand, supra note 7, at 363, 365-69 (arguing that the Court has substituted
its own agenda for that of Congress); Silver, supra note 108, at 303 ("If the Justices are inno-
cently confused, why the cheap shots?").
284. See Newman, supra note 57, at 7-14; Silver, supra note 1, at 963-69.
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be seen from the available cases, it created confusion in the lower courts.
The holding in Farrar substitutes personal judicial preferences for Con-
gress' stated intent. Although too early to predict with certainty, the pri-
vate civil rights bar may begin bringing forth claims only where there are
substantial compensable injuries. However, constitutional violations harm
society as a whole. Unfortunately, because Farrar raises serious questions
about the continuing viability of attorney fee awards, the financial incen-
tive for attorneys to act as private attorneys general by subsidizing lengthy
and complex litigation is minimized. Congress must begin thoughtfully
redrafting fee-shifting litigation.
Laura E. Flenniken

